That is, they think all of their decisions were preordained, and then use this to claim that they can’t be held responsible for anything they do.
That is, they think all of their decisions were preordained, and then use this to claim that they can’t be held responsible for anything they do.
Your brain is you, though, just like your hands are you. Whether there’s a lag between the time that imaging detects you made a decision and you say you made one does not change the fact that you’re the one making the decision.
That’s one way of seeing things, and I respect that viewpoint, but I disagree. I primarily view myself as my consciousness; everything else is secondary. How do you know you aren’t a brain in a vat?
I’m a fallibilist: I don’t believe we can know anything for certain. The best we can do is base propositions off contingent statements: “If what I see is reliable, then what I see in the mirror is not a brain in a vat.”
A brain in a vat is not a very useful starting axioms, so I have no reason to give it serious consideration. By contrast, while taking the general accuracy of my own senses as axiomatic eventually leads me to conclude they can be fallible (example: hallucinations,) it is nonetheless a way more useful axiom for deriving a base of contingent knowledge.