JUICYJAM: How Thai Authorities Use Online Doxxing to Suppress Dissent - The Citizen Lab
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A sustained, coordinated social media harassment and doxxing campaign – which we codenamed JUICYJAM – targeting the pro-democracy movement in Thailand has run uninterrupted, and unchallenged, since at least August 2020. Through our analysis of public social media posts we determined that the campaign was not only inauthentic, but the information revealed could not have been reasonably sourced from a private individual.
  • Since at least August 2020, a coordinated social media harassment and doxxing campaign targeting the Thai pro-democracy movement has run uninterrupted and unchallenged. We codenamed it JUICYJAM.
  • Thanks to a public leak of confidential military and police documents that occurred in March 2025, we can now attribute the campaign to the Royal Thai Armed Forces and/or the Royal Thai Police, whose online repression efforts have allegedly been merged into a joint “Cyber Team” since 2023.
  • The campaign operates within a broader context of dissent repression tactics, both online and offline, that closely resemble those we have previously analyzed in other regions – such as, for example, in Hong Kong.
  • JUICYJAM’s longstanding, uninterrupted activity over multiple social media platforms (primarily X and Facebook) once again exposes the shortcomings of platforms in creating and enforcing policies on highly coordinated and harmful doxxing campaigns intended to suppress civil society.
  • Platforms’ policies on doxxing seldom consider the behaviour in the context of coordinated – and often state-sponsored – campaigns against civil society. They also do not consider environmental factors, such as the doxxing happening during unrest and protests.