Good point. I should probably start including some real world stuff in future versions of this argument… the Wikipedia page on the Pegasus spyware has a depressingly long list of publically-known deployments.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus_(spyware)#By_country
Cellebrite is another big one, because whilst its tools generally require physical access, they’re regularly used by law enforcement and border staff and it is tricky to say “no” when the latter demands access to your phone. They specifically seek to crack grapheneos (see this old capabilities list) and signal, the latter leading to this wonderful bit of trolling by moxie.
Avoiding phone exploits is considerably more hassle than changing cipher suites (grapheneos and iOS in lockdown mode require a bunch of compromises, for example).
One to watch from a safe distance: dafdef, an “ai browser” aimed at founders and “UCG creators”, named using the traditional amazon-keysmash naming technique and and following the ai-companies-must-have-a-logo-suggestive-of-an-anus style guide.
So… spicy autocomplete.
But that’s not all! Tired of your chatbot being unable to control everything on your iphone, due to irksome security features implemented by those control freaks at apple? There’s a way around that!
Introducing the “ai key”!
I’m sure you can absolutely trust an ai browser connected to a tool that has nearly full control over your phone to not do anything bad, because prompt injection isn’t a thing, right?
(I say nearly full, because I think Apple Pay requires physical interaction with a phone button or face id, but if dafdef can automate the boring and repetitive parts of using your banking app then having full control of the phone might not matter)
h/t to ian coldwater