Basically every local service is accessed via a web interface, and every interface wants a username and password. Assuming none of these services are exposed to the internet, how much effort do you put into security here?
Personally, I didn’t really think about it when I started. I make a half-assed effort at security where I don’t use “admin” or anything obvious as the username, and I use a decent-but-not-industrial password - but I started reusing the u/p as the number of services I’m running grew. I have my browsers remember the u/ps.
Should one go farther than this? And if so, what’s the threat model? Is there an easier way?

  • SchmidtGenetics@lemmy.world
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    3 months ago

    … all it can take is going to a website from a windows device… maybe less, it was literally discovered a couple days ago…

    It’s not like having IPv6 enabled on a windows machine automatically makes it instantly exploitable by anyone out there.

    Yes it actually kinda does, that’s why this exploit is considered the highest priority and critical.

    But sure… downplay it, because we only think servers are at risk…

    Yeesh buddy.

    • towerful
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      3 months ago

      If your windows computer makes an outbound connection to a server that is actively exploiting this, then yes: you will suffer.

      But having a windows computer that is chilling behind a network firewall that is only forwarding established ipv6 traffic (like 99.9999% of default routers/firewalls), then you are extremely extremely ultra unlucky to be hit by this (or, you are such a high value target that it’s likely government level exploits). Or, you are an idiot visiting dogdy websites or running dodgy software.

      Once a device on a local network has been successfully exploited for the RCE to actually gain useful code execution, then yes: the rest of your network is likely compromised.
      Classic security in layers. Isolatation/layering of risky devices (that’s why my homelab is on a different vlan than my home network).
      And even if you don’t realise your windows desktop has been exploited (I really doubt that this is a clean exploit, you would probably notice a few BSOD before they figure out how to backdoor), it then has to actually exploit your servers.
      Even if they turn your desktop into a botnet node, that will very quickly be cleaned out by windows defender.
      And I doubt that any attacker will have time to actually turn this into a useful and widespread exploit, except in targeting high value targets (which none of us here are. Any nation state equivalent of the US DoD isn’t lurking on Lemmy).

      It comes back to: why are you running windows as a server?

      ETA:
      The possibility that high value targets are exposing windows servers on IPv6 via public addresses is what makes this CVE so high.
      Sensible people and sensible companies will be using Linux.
      Sensible people and sensible companies will be very closely monitoring what’s going on with windows servers exposed by ipv6.
      This isn’t an “ipv6 exploit”. This is a windows exploit. Of which there have been MANY!